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VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer file sharing presents one of the most difficult problems facing the
music industry today. Downloading songs from a friend's collection instead of
buying the album is not only easy but free. It also exemplifies classic copyright
infringement, but most file sharers do not seem to mind the risk of being sued.
File sharing may simply offer too many benefits for even the very real specter of
prosecution to deter sharers.
But alarmists "fear that [peer-to-peer] file swapping poses a mortal threat to
the copyright system that sustains authors, artists, and a multi-billion-dollar-a-year
industry in the production and dissemination of creative expression."' In the last
few years, the recording industry has waged war against copyright infringers, filing
actions against everyone from enablers like Napster2 and Grokster 3 to thousands
of individuals, including recent actions against college students at seventeen
college campuses.4 The success of these suits, however, has been mixed at best.'
Although the recent Grokster decision reaffirms that file sharing services enable
illegal copyright infringement,6 such litigation fails to provide a real solution to the
problem. Despite the lawsuits, billions of songs are still traded every month.7
Furthermore, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has given
itself a black eye by pursuing actions against the deceased,' a forty-two year-old
' Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2003-2004).
2 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Napster may be held liable for operating a file sharing program enabling copyright infringement).
3 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,2770 (2005) (holding
that file sharing services that enable users to infringe on copyrights, despite the fact that the service
itself does not engage in copyright infringement, may also be held liable for such infringement).
' Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Latest Round of Music Industry Lawsuits
Targets Internet Theft at 17 College Campuses (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.riaa.com/
news/newsleter/092905.asp.
s Seegeneraly Netanel, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the music industry's strategy for enforcing
copyrights and the "significant public relations and marketing risks" involved).
6 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
See Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet:
Impl'cationsfor the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635, 641
(2004) (estimating the number of file sharers in the hundreds of millions globally and up to sixty
million in the United States alone).
' Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, THE REG., Feb. 5, 2005, available at http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa__sues-the-dead/.
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disabled single mother accused of downloading gangster rap,9 and a twelve-year-
old honor student from Manhattan."
Despite its panic, the music industry has neither eradicated the copyright
infringement that results from peer-to-peer file sharing by suing individual sharers
nor found any other realistic solution. The ubiquity of file sharing clearly
indicates that, short of turning off the Internet, it will be practically impossible to
end infringement. It is equally obvious that filing millions of lawsuits against each
individual file sharer fail to provide a viable solution.
The recording industry has also failed to recognize the value file sharing offers.
Not only can users access music for free, but writers and publishers have access
to free promotion." Making a song available for downloading to generate hype
about a new release takes seconds, and relying on peer-to-peer sharing to
disseminate the song costs the music industry very little. This promotion strategy
is particularly promising for breaking new bands into the market, an undertaking
that, using traditional promotional mechanisms, requires record companies to take
huge financial risks. 2
Further, file sharing has made a great contribution to creative expression-a
closely held value in our society. 3 File sharing is a "vehicle for finding works that
are otherwise not available, discovering new genres, making personalized
compilations, and posting creative remixes, sequels, and modifications of popular
works.""4 It is a tool for the general population to use for self-expression, and to
"share their interests, creativity and active enjoyment with others."'"
The music industry now faces the task of designing a system in which writers
and publishers are compensated without losing the promotional value of file
sharing, while consumers are free to download and trade songs without the fear
9 Posting of Ray Beckerman to Recording Industry v. The People: A Blog Devoted to the
RIAA's Lawsuits of Intimidation Brought Against Ordinary Working People, http://recordingindus
tryvspeople.blogspot.com/2005/10/oregon-riaa-victim-fights-back-sues.html (Oct. 3, 2005, 9:50
EST).
10 Download Suit Targets 12 Year Old (CBS television broadcast Sept. 9, 2003), availabke at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/09/tech/main572426.shtml.
" DONALD PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 371-79 (Free
Press 2003) (1991).
2 See id. (noting that although low-cost promotion allows unsigned artists to promote their own
work without assistance from a record label, it allows allunsigned bands to do so and may end up
flooding the Internet with too much poor quality music to make such promotion a useful tool).
13 SeeJessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (stating
that the "purpose of copyright is to encourage the creation and mass dissemination of a wide variety
of works').
14 Netanel, supra note 1, at 3.
15 Id.
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of being sued for copyright infringement or having their efforts at self-expression
dampened.
Scholars and music industry players have presented numerous proposals for
solving this problem. The ideas run the gamut from compulsory licensing and
non-commercial use levies1 6 to digital abandon. 7 This Note, however, will focus
on the viability of voluntary collective licensing. Under a voluntary collective
licensing scheme, all members would make a nominal contribution, perhaps five
dollars, 8 in exchange for immunity from copyright infringement suits and the
right to trade music freely. 9 In return, writers and publishers would receive
royalties for their participation in the scheme from the fund of member
contributions.
20
All parties get what they want: writers and publishers get the promotional
value of file sharing and consumers get to trade music. And everyone gets what
they need: writers and publishers get paid and consumers get a guarantee that they
will not be sued.
But can any solution to a problem that has plagued the music industry for the
last decade really be that simple?
Voluntary collective licensing is not a new concept, but its application to file
sharing is virtually unprecedented.2 ' Broadcasters, however, use voluntary
collective licensing almost exclusively to license music played on the radio, and in
restaurants, clubs and other public places. This Note will analyze the way
collective licensing functions for broadcasting music as a potential model for
applying the concept to file sharing.
16 Id at 4.
17 Id. Digital abandon is the concept that "noncommercial personal uses should be free from
both copyright holder control and government imposed levies to compensate copyright owners."
Id
,8 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, A BETTER WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY
COLLECTIVE LICENSING OF Music FILE SHARING "LET THE MUSIC PLAY" WHITE PAPER (Feb.
2004), http://www.eff.org/share/coUective-lic-wp.pdf.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 One example of a very limited application is a recent attempt by an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) in the United Kingdom to allow members of the ISP to freely trade any song in the Sony BMG
catalog. Press Release, World's Only Music ISP Signs Landmark UK Deal with Sony BMG (Aug.
22, 2005), availabk at http://www.playloudermsp.com/pressrelease-22aug05.html. Members of
PLAYLOUDERMSP (PLMSP) "purchase their broadband access directly from PLMSP for an all-in
fee of £26.99 per month." Id "As well as receiving all the standard facilities and services (such as
fast internet access and email), PLMSP customers are also able to enjoy unlimited legal downloading
of music and can freely share licensed music with other PLMSP subscribers using P2P file-sharing
for no extra cost." Id
2006]
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Part II will address the rights at issue in broadcasting, discuss the necessity of
licensing, and explain the models broadcasters currently use to manage the
required licenses and the challenges those models have faced. For manageability,
this Note is restricted to the broadcast radio licensing practices of the three main
licensing organizations in the United States.22 Part III will discuss the nuances of
the voluntary collective licensing plan and specifically consider the proposal in the
Electronic Frontier Foundation's (EFF) recently published white paper.23 Part IV
will look critically at the proposal and analyze both the challenges-inherent in
the broadcast model and the unique challenges presented by its proposed
application to peer-to-peer file sharing. Finally, Part V will argue that despite the
attractiveness of the voluntary collective licensing model, its adoption poses
practical problems that may prove insurmountable.
II. PERFORMANCE RIGHTS AND PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
A. WHAT ARE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS?
Copyright law grants the writer or publisher of any given song or album a
bundle of rights including rights to record, to publish, and to play the music.24
With few exceptions, a radio station, restaurant, or club that wants to play a song
must get permission to do so.2
5
The right to play or broadcast music is a public performance right, a right
which was first recognized in 1897 by the Copyright Act.26 Under the Act, "to
'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or
by means of any device or process ... 27 This definition is interpreted to
encompass broadcasting music.2' The Act further provides that copyright holders
have the exclusive right to approve public performance of a copyrighted work.29
Therefore, in order for a radio station to play a song consistent with this right, the
2 The three main licensing organizations in the United States are American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers; Broadcast Music Incorporated; and Society of European State
Authors and Composers. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 871 (Aspen Law
and Business 1996) (1992). The logistics of these organizations are explained below.
23 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18.
24 See 17 U.S.C.A. % 106, 114 (West 2005).
' General exceptions are made for non-profit performances, "mom and pop" stores, record
stores, and state fairs, among others. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 869-70. See 17 U.S.C. § 114
(2000) for a list of exceptions to exclusive performance rights.
26 SIDNEY SHEMEL & M. WILLIAM KRASiLovSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 182 (Billboard
Publ'ns, Inc. 1985) (1964).
27 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005).
28 SHEMEL & KRASiLovsKY, supra note 26, at 182.
29 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4) (West 2005).
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performance of the music must be authorized by the exclusive copyright holder.
In other words, the performance must be licensed.
The broad definition of public performance in the Copyright Act means that
most instances of playing music in public require licensing. The daunting
prospect of obtaining an individual license for each song a radio station intends
to broadcast inspired the development of organizations that specialize in
obtaining those licenses.3'
B. THE HISTORY OF ASCAP, BMI, AND SESAC
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP),
Broadcast Media Incorporated (BMI), and the Society of European State Authors
and Composers (SESAC)" are performance rights organizations that control
virtually all licensing of music in the United States.32 These organizations are so
integral to the management of performance rights that Congress specifically
named ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC as examples when it defined "performing rights
society" as "an association, corporation or other entity that licenses the public
performance of nondramatic musical works on behalf of the copyright owners of
such works. 33
ASCAP is the oldest of the three organizations. A group of songwriters and
publishers (among them Victor Herbert and John Philip Sousa) who were
frustrated with hearing their compositions played in clubs without receiving any
royalties from the performance founded ASCAP in 1914.' Because this group
realized that the task of enforcing exclusive performance rights in each club and
restaurant would be impossible for each individual songwriter or publisher, they
formed ASCAP to serve as the central body for enforcing those rights and
collecting royalties on behalf of the artists. 3 Within twelve years of its inception,
ASCAP had won several lawsuits and overcome resistance to its control from
venue owners and radio broadcasters.
36
In response to ASCAP's monopoly of performance rights licensing, a group
of about five hundred broadcasters banded together and founded BMI in 1940.37
30 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 864.
31 The organization is now known only as SESAC, which is no longer used as an acronym since
its presence in the United States has grown. SESAC - Who We Are and What We Do, https://
www.sesac.com/writerpublisher/whatissesac.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
32 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 871.
31 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
-' KOHN & KOHN, spra note 22, at 863-64.
31 Id. at 864-65.
36 Id. at 865-66.
1 Id. at 866.
2006]
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just one year later, after quickly building a catalog of their own songwriters and
publishers, BMI began competing with ASCAP. BMI survived and became the
"new self-proclaimed 'automatic performance royalty earning machine' for
songwriters and publishers.,
38
Finally, in 1931, a single European music publisher named Paul Heineke
established SESAC,39 the smallest of the three performance rights organizations.'
When SESAC began, it specialized in country and gospel music and therefore did
not threaten ASCAP's dominant market position.4 ' But in 1973, the organization
expanded its catalog, which now includes virtually all genres of music.42 SESAC's
highest profile songwriters are Neil Diamond and Bob Dylan.43
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WRITERS AND PUBLISHERS AND THE
PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
Performance rights organizations serve two basic functions on behalf of
writers and publishers': copyright clearance and copyright enforcement.4" Due
primarily to the difficulty of enforcing performance rights, virtually all songwriters
and publishers now join organizations that specialize in such enforcement.'
When they join an organization, "songwriters and copyright owners grant to
performance rights societies a license to sublicense the rendition of public
performances of their musical works."'47 These contracts between the copyright
holder and the organization are governed by consent decrees in which a court
authorizes the arrangement, provided the license is nonexclusive.' In exchange,
38 Id. at 867.
39 SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 26, at 184.
40 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 867.
41 In exchange, the organization pays royalties: half to the publisher as a group, and half to the
songwriters.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Performance rights organizations offer membership only to writers and publishers, not to
persons who record or perform works written and published by others. See, e.g., About ASCAP:
How You Join, http://www.ascap.com/about/howjoin.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006); see alsoJoin
BMI, https://applications.bmi.com/affiiation/joinen.aspx ("You can join as a writer, a publisher,
or both.") (last visited Feb. 9, 2006); SESAC - How to Affiliate, http://www.sesac.com/
writerpublisher/howtoaffiliate.aspx ("SESAC only collects royalties on behalf of songwriters and
composers.') (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
" Lionel S. Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act." An Anaysis of the 'Economic Reali'ies"
ofBlanketlicensing 3 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1983).
46 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 876.
47 Id.
48 Id
[Vol. 13:405
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the organization pays royalties: half to the publishers as a group, and half to the
songwriters.4 9 See illustration 1 below.
Illustration 1.
royalties (5000 to Performance mmrhfe
writers, 50%!. to I Rights membership fees
publishers) % I Organization
,I sub-licenses S.
Writers performance Broadcastersand rights licenses and other
Publishers licensees
Although ASCAP, BMI and SESAC all allocate royalties evenly between
songwriters as a group and publishers as a group, each organization has a unique
method of distributing royalties within each group.
1. ASCAP. In determining the royalties due to each of its members, ASCAP
first calculates the number of performances of each work in its catalog."0 Because
each year "there are billions of performances" from the ASCAP catalog, the
organization uses consensus surveys, tracking every performance only when
possible."' Particularly for radio performances, ASCAP more often uses sample
surveys that track performances statistically, relying on "advanced digital tracking
technology... station logs (lists of works performed) provided to [ASCAP] by
the radio stations, and by recorded tapes of actual broadcasts.""
Each performance accounted for by either consensus or sample surveys is
then assigned a specific number of credits.5 3 When calculating credits due for
each performance, ASCAP considers several factors, including 'HOW the music
is used... WHERE the music is performed... HOW much the licensee pays
9 Id; see also About ASCAP: Turning Performances into Dollars, http://www.ascap.com/
about/payment/doUars.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
so About ASCAP: Keeping Track of Performances, http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/
keepingtrack.htmI (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
~'Id
52 ASCAP Payment System: Identifying Performances, http://www.ascap.com/about/
payment/identifying.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
53 ASCAP, smupra note 49.
2006]
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[ASCAP], [t]he time of day of the performance,... [and tlhe general licensing
allocation applied to radio and television performances.
' ' 4
The number of credits earned by each performance according to this formula
is then multiplied by the value of one credit."5 For example, if a given
songwriter's work earned one hundred credits within a pay period, and a
songwriter's credit was calculated at five dollars, the songwriter would receive five
hundred dollars in royalty payments.5 6
2. BMI. The BMI and ASCAP models are similar in several respects. Under
both models, artists receive credit for performances determined through sampling
as a basis for payment. In determining numbers of performances, both
organizations use digital tracking information and both use information provided
by radio stations.57 However, BMI's model differs in three significant ways: in
the method of collecting performance information from radio stations, in the
formula for determining the value of a performance, and in calculating the royalty
payment.
58
First, although ASCAP uses radio station logs to help calculate
performances, 9 BMI uses a unique system whereby it requires each member
station to provide detailed logs of performances for three days a year.60 The
organization assigns different three-day periods to each radio station to ensure
that every day of the year is logged by at least one member, and then compiles the
information as a "statistically reliable projection" of performances on all
commercial radio stations.6'
Also, BMI's valuation of performances is more straightforward than ASCAP's
system. Instead of using a credit system that weights a complex set of factors to
determine the value of one performance,62 BMI assigns each performance the
value of one.63 The royalty calculation is simply based on the number of
performances of each work."
4 Id.
55 Id.
s The value of one credit for either a songwriter or a publisher "is determined annually, taking
into account the estimated total number of ASCAP credits being processed for writers or publishers
and the total number of dollars available for distribution." Id
" See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. BMI looks at surveys by MediaBase and Nielsen
BDS in addition to its own survey. BMI, Royalty Information: U.S. Radio Royalties, http://www.
bmi.com/songwriter/resources/pubs/royaltyradio.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
s BMI, supra note 57.
s ASCAP, supra note 52.
o BMI, supra note 57.
6t Id
62 See ASCAP, supra note 49 (discussing ASCAP's credit system).
63 BMI, supra note 57.
64 Id.
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Finally, BMI's royalty calculation differs slightly from ASCAP's formula.
Instead of considering the number of performance credits earned by each work
overall and allocating royalties according to the "total number of dollars available
for distribution,"65 BMI's model is station specific. BMI "calculates a unique
royalty rate for each work, which is based upon the license fees collected from
stations that performed that work in combination with the number of times each
work aired on those stations.,
66
3. SESAC. SESAC, the smallest of the organizations (controlling only about
1% of all performance rights),67 serves basically the same function as ASCAP and
BMI. However, its business model differs significantly from both of the other
performance rights organizations.
Most notably, the organization is a private company that operates for profit,
dividing proceeds between itself and its writer and publisher members. 68 Also,
SESAC has not traditionally tracked performances to calculate royalty payments,
but instead has relied on chart position as an indicator of the popularity of a song
and therefore a rough indicator of how often that song is broadcast.69 However,
the organization appears to be moving in the direction of the more extensive
logging practices of ASCAP and BMI. The method used to calculate royalties is
now "based on many factors, including state-of-the-art monitoring, computer
database information and broadcast logs.
7
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND
LICENSEES
Because performance rights organizations handle virtually all licensing for
writers and publishers, broadcasters and other licensees consistently join these
organizations to obtain proper permission for performances. 7 Broadcasters
receive blanket licenses,72 licenses that enable radio stations and other licensees
to "render an unlimited number of nondramatic performances of one or more of
any of the hundreds of thousands of songs in their respective catalogs," in
65 ASCAP, supra note 49.
6 Royalty Information, supra note 57.
67 PASSMAN, supra note 11, at 219.
6 SHEMEL & KRAsILOvsKY, supra note 26, at 184.
69 Id.
70 SESAC, sapra note 31.
71 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 877.
72 Id. at 878-81. Although blanket licenses are by far the most common, additional types of
licenses are available. Id For example broadcasters, writers and publishers may deal with one
another directly to arrange source or direct licenses. Id Also, radio and television stations may
negotiate per program licenses with performance rights organization. Id
2006]
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exchange for membership fees. 3 Performance rights organizations, through
blanket licenses, also indemnify radio stations against copyright infringement
claims 74
Both ASCAP's fees and BMI's fees are negotiated between organization
representatives and the Radio Music License Committee, a committee comprised
of proninent and diverse members of the music industry.7 5 Membership fees are
calculated for each radio station (according to level of income) and amount to
approximately two percent of each station's gross annual receipts.76 For example,
between 1996 and 2000, ASCAP's fees were calculated between 1% (for stations
earning less than $150,000 per year) and 1.615% (for stations earning $150,000 or
more per year) of a station's annual income. 7 SESAC, however, does not
calculate fees based on annual income. It bases blanket license fees on the size
of the radio station's market and the station's rate schedule,"5 making each
station's fees entirely unique.
E. CONSENT DECREES
Court-sanctioned consent decrees govern the basic licensing practices of
ASCAP and BMI.V 9 In 1941, the Justice Department sued both ASCAP and BMI
"alleging that the blanket licenses used by both illegally restrained trade in
violation of the antitrust laws.""° The initial consent decrees establishing the rules
under which ASCAP 8" and BM182 could legally operate were entered in response
to these lawsuits. Both consent decrees have been amended several times, but the
organizations continue to operate under the basic terms established in the original
1941 decrees.83 Key terms of these agreements include provisions that require
1 Id. at 878.
14 Customer Licensees: Radio Licensing FAQs, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/radio/
radiofaq.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
" Id.; see also Radio: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bmi.com/licensing/broadcaster/
radio/faq03.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
76 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 22, at 878.
n Id
78 SESAC: Frequently Asked Questions By Broadcasters, http://sesac.com/licensing/
broadcastLlicensing-faq.aspx#sesac (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
' SESAC is not subject to a consent decree, so the organization's established regulations govern
its actions. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 26, at 188-89.
80 Sobel, supra note 45, at 5-6.
S See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 1940-1943 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
' See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,096 (E.D. Wis.
1941).
3 ASCAP's consent decree was amended by United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors
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non-exclusive licensing.84 This means that each writer or publisher who is
affiliated with a performance rights organization is also ,free to enter into direct
licensing agreements with a radio station or other entity and per-program
licensing in addition to traditional blanket licensing. 8 The decrees also provide
details such as court sanctioned definitions of terms involved in the agreements,
limitations on the actions of performance rights organizations, and rules
governing specific activities like the allocation of royalties and performance
tracking requirements.86
F. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
When licensing disputes arise between the performing rights organization and
either a writer or publisher or licensees, ASCAP and BMI have established
grievance procedures by which the aggrieved party can file a formal complaint
with the organization.
7
ASCAP's Articles of Association create a Board of Review that receives
complaints and is bound to issue a decision in writing to address any member
concerns.8 8 The Articles outline an appeals process, but protesting members are
bound by the decision of the Board.89
BMI submits disputes to an arbitrator who settles the disagreement according
to the rules of the American Arbitration Association."
As a result of these procedures, the disputes between ASCAP or BMI and
their respective members and licensees are taken off the dockets of the federal
courts.9 SESAC however, is not subject to a consent decree and has no
published grievance procedures.92
and Publishers, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) and again by United States
v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,474 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). BMI's consent decree was amended by United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and again by United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
84 Sobel, supra note 45, at 6.
85 Id.
8 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
87 KOHN & KOHN, spra note 22, at 884.
'8 AM. SOC'Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, 15-16 (May 2002) [hereinafter
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION], available at http://www.ascap.com/reference/articles.pdf.
89 Id. at 16.90 United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
9t ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 88, at 16.
92 SHEMEL & KRAsILOvsKY, supra note 26, at 198.
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G. CHALLENGES TO THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION MODELS
The primary challenges to the performance rights organizations' models have
come in the form of opposition to the blanket licensing provisions in the consent
decrees.93 The consent decrees did not eradicate allegations of antitrust violations
that began in the 1930s-such allegations have "haunt[ed] ASCAP [and BMI]
ever since."94
Licensees challenging ASCAP or BMI claim that the performance rights
organizations violate antitrust laws through price fixing and monopolizing or
otherwise illegally restraining trade through the use of blanket licenses.9
However, courts have repeatedly rebuffed attempts to challenge consent decrees,
finding that the licensing practices did not violate, antitrust laws because
agreements between the organizations and writers and publishers are non-
exclusive and because under the consent decrees licensees are free to apply to the
court to review rates.96
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC also appear in court as plaintiffs to enforce
copyrights. All three organizations actively pursue infringers who fail to pay
membership fees or otherwise obtain proper licensing for the songs they
perform.97 But in one way particularly pertinent to this Note, courts have limited
the reach of performance rights organizations.
Prior to the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, ASCAP and BMI asserted
that when small businesses played the radio in their establishments those
businesses infringed the copyrights of performance rights organization members.
For example, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, the performance rights
organizations sued a restaurant owner who was not a member of ASCAP or BMI
for infringement after learning that he played the radio in his dining area.9" The
Court held the restaurant owner was not liable for copyright infringement.99 In
its opinion, the Court remarked that a law purporting to hold all small business
13 Sobel, supra note 45, at 7.
94 Id at 5.
9' Id. at 7-9.
96 See Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d
Cit. 1984) (reversing the lower court's decision and finding no violation of antitrust laws); see also
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that blanket licenses do
not constitute per se price fixing under antitrust law); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that because the affiliate
agreements were non-exclusive, consent decrees did not violate antitrust laws); Broad. Music, Inc.
v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981), aft'd, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cit. 1982) (holding that
blanket licenses did not violate antitrust laws).
9' See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
9s 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
99 Id at 164.
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owners who play radios in their establishments liable for copyright infringement
would not only be "wholly unenforceable" but also "highly inequitable."' ° The
court rested its holding on a narrow construction of the word "perform" under
the 1909 version of the Copyright Act to justify finding that Aiken's actions did
not constitute performance under the code, and therefore concluded that Aiken
was not liable for copyright infringement.''
In response to cases like Aiken, Congress included new exceptions in the 1976
revision of the Copyright Act. 0 2 Congress agreed with the Aiken court's opinion
that holding all small businesses liable would be unduly oppressive, 0 3 but rather
than leave courts to rely on the narrow construction of "perform" in order to
avoid imposing liability, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) to ensure that
sufficiently small businesses are exempt from infringement claims for playing the
radio in their establishments."° The legislative history accompanying the code
section specifically addresses Aiken and explains that
the clause would exempt small commercial establishments whose
proprietors merely bring onto their premises standard radio or
television equipment and turn it on for their customers' enjoyment,
but it would impose liability where the proprietor has a commercial
"sound system" installed or converts a standard home receiving
apparatus (by augmenting it with sophisticated or extensive
amplification equipment) into the equivalent of a commercial sound
system.'05
This new section effectively limited ASCAP's and BMI's ability to reach small
businesses on infringement claims, however courts have been strict in applying
the standard for permissible equipment in 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) and have commonly
found commercial establishments to have exceeded the bounds of the
exception."
'00 Id. at 162-63.
1t' Id. at 157-64.
102 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
103 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 164.
'- 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976). In 1998 Congress, as part of the Copyright Term Extension Act,
amended 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), broadening the performances that do not require licensing in small
commercial establishments.
'05 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
106 See Crabshaw Music v. K-Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (holding
that the exception did not apply because the restaurant exceeded the permissible number of
speakers); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the small business exception did not apply because the defendant used a sound system not intended
for a home). But see Broad. Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1495-96 (7th Cir.
20061
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III. APPLYING THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS MODEL TO FILE SHARING
As the music industry struggles to find a solution to the file sharing
dilemma, °7 the successful performance rights organization model presents a
potential answer. In February 2004,"8 the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),
"a group of passionate people-lawyers, technologists, volunteers, and
visionaries-working in the trenches, battling to protect your rights and the rights
of web surfers everywhere," 1°9 released a white paper entitled "A Better Way
Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing 'Let the Music
Play' White Paper."' 10 In the paper, the EFF authors assert that voluntary
collective licensing offers the best solution to the music industry's file sharing
predicament."' As the EFF authors observe, "[t]he curTent battles surrounding
peer-to-peer file sharing are a losing proposition for everyone. The record labels
continue to face lackluster sales, while the tens of millions of American file
sharers-American music fans-are made to feel like criminals."'
112
Implementing a voluntary current licensing scheme may be the most
promising path out of our current rut in which privacy is at risk, "innovation [is]
stymied, economic growth suppressed, and a few unlucky individuals [are] singled
out for legal action by the recording industry.""' 3 But many daunting questions
must be addressed: How will the scheme work practically? How will the money
be collected and divided? What are the implications of doing business with
millions of individual users as opposed to thousands of relatively sophisticated
broadcast organizations? Will the same antitrust violation allegations haunt a
collective licensing scheme for file sharing?"'
1991) (holding that a chain store did qualify for an exemption because each individual store used
home-type stereo equipment reasoning that Congress provided an exception based on the "quantity
and quality of the receiving equipment," not whether a company could afford the license).
'o See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
108 Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 712 (2005).
109 Electronic Frontier Foundation: Our Mission, http://www.eff.org/mission.php (last visited
Jan. 14, 2006).
"' Electronic Frontier Foundation: A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of
Music File Sharing, http://www.eff.org/share/collective-lic-wp.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
..' ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 1.
112 id
113 Id.
114 Reaching any of these questions depends on the determination that file sharing implicates
digital performance tights as opposed to mechanical tights.
While the Copyright Act provides protection for both copies and digital performances of
sound recordings, in order for a file sharing model to effectively operate parallel to the broadcast
model of voluntary collective licensing, sharing files must qualify as performances of the music. The
Act provides that copyright holders of sound recordings have exclusive rights
to do and to authorize... [reproduction of] the copyrighted work in copies or
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phonorecords; [preparation of] derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; [distribution of] copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;...
[or] in the case of sound recordings, [performance of] the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3), (6) (2000).
Scholars and copyright experts are currently engaged in a heated debate about whether these
rights are performance rights. PASSMAN, supra note 11, at 286. While performance rights
organizations insist that digital transmissions are performances, and thereby subject only to the
control of the copyright holder, the mechanical tights camp insist that digital transmissions amount
to distribution of copies and thus require mechanical licenses. Id at 208,286. The code defines "to
perform" a work as "to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device
or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Also, the code
defines copies as
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other
than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
Id The dispute remains unresolved.
Now it's true that a transmission isn't a "performance" in the traditional sense,
because it isn't being played in a form to which you could listen. (Actually, you
could listen, but it sounds like a parakeet in a blender.) On the other hand, it's
obviously not the sale of a tangible record either, so it's not clear the distribution
triggers a mechanical royalty (other than transmissions that really are sales of
records in the form of downloads, which were specifically covered in the [Digital
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995]).
PASSMAN, supra note 11, at 286. Resolving the disagreement between the competing interest groups
is beyond the scope of this Note.
This Note will assume that file sharing constitutes a performance of the musical work and
therefore the copyright holder retains exclusive control over digital performance rights under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
Although the code does provide for some specific limitations on digital performance rights,
none apply directly to file sharing. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000). File sharing would be considered an
"interactive service" that is generally within the exclusive right outlined in the code section. 17
U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000). But see 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3) (2000) for exceptions. The code defines
"interactive service" as a service that "enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of
a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound
recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient."
17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) (2000).
The reader should be aware that this issue may arise when actually implementing a voluntary
collective licensing scheme.
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A. THE PLAN
The goals of the EFF's proposal are: 1) to ensure fair compensation for
copyright holders, while accepting that file sharing continues to grow in popularity
despite the fact that the recording industry "kill[ed] Napster,' ". 2) to recognize
that file sharers make more music available than online music stores like iTunes,"
6
and 3) to make government intervention unnecessary by relying on the market." 7
In order to accomplish these goals, the EFF authors envision a scheme in
which the music'indu-stry forms a collecting organization, specifically naming the
performance rights organizations that control broadcast radio as its precedent."'
The newscheme would simply replace the broadcasters who acquire licenses from
performance rights organizations under the traditional model with individual
users." 9 This new digital performance rights organization would bear the
responsibility, like its broadcast radio predecessor, of both enforcing copyrights
and granting performance licenses. See illustration 2 below.
Illustration 2.
Voluntary Collective Licensing Traditional Broadcast Model
royalties (50/ to Performance mebesh
writers, 50% to 1  Rights membership fees
publishers) % Organization
sub-licenses ____________
performance 4.
Writers rights licenses Broadcastersand and other
Publishers an ers
ns The Ninth Circuit held that the Napster file sharing service illegally enabled users to infringe
on copyrights. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). A revised
version of Napster's website now allows users to download songs but abandons the old peer-to-peer
model. Napster website, http://www.napster.com/more-about-napster.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2006).
116 iTunes allows users to purchase individual songs or entire albums online. Apple-iTunes:
Overview, http://www.apple.com/itunes/overview/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
117 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, smpra note 18, at 1.
118 Id. at 2.
119 Id. at 1.
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Voluntary Collective Licensing Model for File sharing
royalties (50% to Digital
writers, 50% to Performance membership fees
publishers) % Rights
Organization
Writers performance sub-licenses __
Wand rights licenses Iivu
Publishers Users
1. The Re/ationship Between DigitalPeformance Rights Organizations and Writers and
Publishers. The EFF authors suggest that digital performance rights organizations
should be non-profit entities,"o give rights-holders a say in its operation, and
divide revenue generated by member contributions between "artists and rights-
holders based on the relative popularity of their music."' 21  The proposal
envisions popularity ratings based partially on information collected through
anonymous monitoring of file sharing activity by services like Big Champagne"2
and partially on a Nielsen-like sampling system."as
Although the EFF proposal provides no further detail regarding the
relationship between the digital performance rights organization and rights-
holders, the broadcast radio model offers workable mechanisms of a voluntary
collective licensing scheme for file sharing. First, the non-exclusive nature of
licensing agreements must be preserved,'24  allowing rights holders to
simultaneously contract with performance rights organizations for radio and for
file sharing. In order for this scheme to work, digital performance rights
'20 Id. at 4.
121 Id. at 2.
122 Big Champagne Online Media Measurement tracks downloads of digital music files and
releases the information as online music charts. Big Champagne Online Media Measurement,
http://www.bigchampagne.com (follow "about us" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
'23 Nielsen Media Research is a service that monitors the popularity of television shows through
"Nielsen People Meters," that are attached to television sets in a random selection of homes that are
used to measure what shows are being watched and who is watching them. Nielsen Media Research,
http://www.nielsenmedia.com (follow "Inside TV Ratings" hyperlink; then follow "Meters and
Diaries" hyperlink; then follow "Our Measurement Techniques" hyperlink) (last visited Apr 18,
2006).
124 See supra notes 48,84 and accompanying text (discussing consent decrees of ASCAP and BMI
entered by courts to resolve antitrust concerns); infra part IV.A.
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organizations must not force rights holders to choose file sharing licensing over
radio licensing.
Also, the success of digital performance rights organizations will depend on
the adequacy of a more detailed plan for royalty distribution. The EFF authors
refer to "artists and rights-holders" as those entitled to payment from the fund
of member contributions. In contrast, under the broadcast radio model only
writers and publishers are eligible for royalties, not performers. Perhaps the EFF
authors intended only to include writers and publishers and not performers in the
term "artists," but any attempt to include performers who have no part of writing
or publishing a song would require a substantial overhaul of the broadcast radio
model and possibly copyright law.'
After identifying the parties eligible to receive royaty distributions, several
methods for distribution are available. 6 All performance rights organizations
treat writers and publishers equally, dividing available funds between the two
groups." 7 Within each group, the most logical way to divide the money would be
to assign a value to each shared file, perhaps based on total available funds divided
by the total number of shared files, and then multiply that value by the number
of files tracked for each song. Presumably, this is the method advocated by the
EFF authors since a higher number of shared files would indicate a song's
popularity.
2 8
2. The Relationship Between Digital Performance Rights Organizahions and Individual
Users. In the same way that performance rights organizations offer blanket
licenses to radio stations allowing for unlimited performances from the
organization's catalog and indemnification against copyright infringement claims
125 Although an artist cannot assert copyright protection for a song she only performs but did
not write or publish, she may be able to assert a right in her persona. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460, 462-63 (holding that although "[a] voice is not copywritable," Bette Midler stated a
valid cause of action for violation of a common law property right when Ford Motor Co. hired a
singer to imitate Ms. Midler's voice for a commercial advertising campaign. The court stated that
"to impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity"). Further discussion of this topic, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note.
126 See supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Also, should a digital performance rights
organization choose to include performers, performers would also presumably be treated equally and
the available funds would be divided into three groups. However, the organization should carefully
consider this decision because the result may be two shares going to one person since many
performers also write their own songs.
12 The EFF authors may also have intended to use a method more like SESAC's chart-position
calculation in which the value of a song correlates to its popularity on the music charts. However,
this method undermines a fundamental advantage of file sharing--allowing lesser-known musicians
who may never register on the charts to benefit from the distribution of their work. See discussion
infra Part IlI.B.
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in exchange for membership fees, 2 9 digital performance rights organizations
would offer individual users unlimited access to file sharing with indemnification
from liability for infringement in exchange for a "reasonable regular payment."''
30
Rather than mirror ASCAP and BMI's fee calculations based on level of income,
or SESAC's user-specific fee calculation, EFF's model would require all individual
file sharers to pay the same flat fee.1
31
The EFF authors assert that equal, minimal contributions from individuals will
be enough to satisfy writers and publishers.132 Based on an estimated sixty million
Americans currently downloading music, multiplied by a five dollar membership
fee, the authors calculate a net profit of three billion dollars each year to be
divided among the copyright holders.133 Compared to the recording industry's
eleven billion dollar gross profits, minus the manufacturing and shipping costs of
CDs, the payola 34 to radio stations, and other costs associated with marketing
physical CD sales, the plan's three billion dollar figure merits consideration.1
31
Moreover, this system of file sharing has the added benefit for individual users
that as the popularity of the service grows, so will its value: "The more people
share, the more money goes to rights-holders. The more competition in
applications, the more rapid the innovation and improvement. The more
freedom to fans to publish what they care about, the deeper the catalog. ')36
3. Consent Decrees and Grievance Procedures. Logically, the operation of a digital
performance rights organization could be governed by a consent decree modeled
after those entered into by ASCAP and BMI. The ASCAP and BMI decrees have
achieved remarkable success in regulating the licensing market over time.
37
Similar decrees could establish who is entitled to royalties, the method of royalty
calculation, and distribution and performance tracking requirements.
Successful grievance procedures established by ASCAP (creating a Board of
Review and appeals process for member complaints) and BMI (resolving disputes
according to the rules of the American Arbitration Association) may also be
useful in designing a digital performance rights organization.3 3 Given the
129 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
130 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 1.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2.
1 Payola is the practice of "employees of broadcast stations, program producers, program
suppliers and others [accepting] payments, services, or other valuable consideration for airing
material...." The FCC's Payola Rules, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/PayolaRules.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
13' ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, spra note 18, at 2.
136 Id. at 1.
137 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing ASCAP and BMI's grievance
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anticipated volume of members, disputes will inevitably arise, and avoiding
litigation by establishing alternative dispute resolution procedures is essential to
preserving the funds available for rights holders.'39  However, grievance
procedures will not prevent the more serious and costly threat of infringement
litigation against non-members.' 4
B. ADVANTAGES OF THE PLAN
Designing a voluntary collective licensing scheme for file sharing presents
significant opportunities to resolve the music industry's current file sharing
dilemma. First, and most obviously, rights holders would not only receive
compensation from the membership fund, but also enjpy the benefit of more
affordable promotion outlets. In particular, independent musicians working
without the benefit of a record company's marketing machine stand to benefit
from the ease of Internet distribution. 14 1
Legitimizing file sharing would not only ensure rights holders royalties to
which they are entitled and save the music industry money, it would also generate
additional revenue. Legally operated file sharing services would create
competition and other market forces that encourage investment in the newly
legitimate business:
Investment dollars pour into the now-legitimized market for digital
music filesharing software and services. Rather than being limited
to a handful of "authorized services" like Apple's iTunes and
Napster 2.0, you'll see a marketplace filled with competing file-
sharing applications and ancillary services. So long as the individual
procedures).
139 Websites with many users often employ such techniques. See, e.g., Amazon.com Conditions
ofUse, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/508088/103-1791368-9937429 ("Any
dispute... shall be submitted to confidential arbitration .... ").
140 Litigation against nonmembers who continue to share files would be a necessary enforcement
mechanism to protect the integrity of the system. Absent such enforcement, the model would offer
few advantages over the current system because individual users would have little incentive to join.
141 Yu, supra note 108, at 672 n.108. The story of the band Wilco is the best illustration of this
possibility. Professor Yu quotes Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir.), tert. granted 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004):
One striking example... is the popular band Wilco, whose record company had
declined to release one of its albums [Yankee HotelFoxtro4 on the basis that it had
no commercial potential. Wilco repurchased the work from the record company
and made the album available for free downloading .... The result sparked
widespread interest and, as a result, Wilco received another recording contract.
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fans are licensed, technology companies can stop worrying about
the impossible maze of licensing and instead focus on providing
fans with the most attractive products and services in a competitive
marketplace.
4 2
Considering the popularity of file sharing, the potential economic effects of
opening up an entirely new market for investment and technological advancement
would be difficult to overstate.
Furthermore, file sharers themselves will benefit as the activity will no longer
be illegal and the fear of copyright infringement lawsuits will disappear. Also, the
consumers who trade songs will pay for the system whenever they wish to be
involved; it is completely voluntary.143
IV. CHALLENGES
Despite the promise of the voluntary collective licensing proposal for file
sharing, any such scheme will undoubtedly face thorny challenges. Those
challenges may in fact prove insurmountable, and if that is the case, such a
scheme will fail. However, the prospect of solving the file sharing puzzle with
such a simple, common-sense solution is so attractive that the problems that arise
are well worth struggling to overcome. Moreover, voluntary collective licensing
may simply be a superior choice to digital abandon or non-commercial use
levies" in a world where file sharing is inevitable.'
A. ANTITRUST CLAIMS RESOLVED, SEE BROADCAST RADIO
The EFF authors correctly anticipate the threat of antitrust issues with respect
to the file sharing model, particularly in that their proposal relies on one single
collecting organization to act as a clearinghouse for most, if not all, digital
performance rights. However, the authors are also correct to argue that a
performing rights organization consent decree-styled regulation scheme is quite
likely to be as successful for file sharing as it has been for broadcast radio.'"
Since ASCAP was formed almost a century ago, performing rights
organizations have been fending off allegations of antitrust violations."4" Despite
142 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 6.
1 Id. at 3-4.
'" See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
145 Netanel, supra note 1, at 10.
146 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 4.
147 See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
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the frequency of challenges to the performance rights model, the original consent
decrees binding ASCAP and BMI issued by the courts in 1941, impressively, still
stand (even though they have been amended on several occasions)."4 These
agreements have survived for more than six decades because of the courts'
wisdom in alternatively enforcing and revising the decrees as the music industry
grows and changes and because of a basic understanding within the music
industry that the arrangement benefits all parties. 49
Consent decrees will likely provide the same workable solution to digital
performance rights organizations as they have to the existing performance rights
organizations in avoiding and defending against antitrust allegations.
B. NEW OBSTACLES INTRODUCED TO VOLUNTARY COIJ.ECTIVE LICENSING BY
FILE SHARING
Voluntary collective licensing as applied to file sharing presents a variety of
unique and troubling problems. While such a scheme is attractive in its simplicity,
the EFF authors fail to consider all of the difficulties with the model. Beyond
antitrust concerns, the music industry will face issues including: the necessity of
dealing with millions of amateur users rather than thousands of relatively
sophisticated radio stations; the phenomenon in which laypersons do not consider
file sharing a serious crime; and the task of deciding whose music is included in
the scheme.
Also "voluntary collective licenses may suffer from the many weaknesses
associated with compulsory licenses. These include the difficulty in dividing the
royalty pool; the lack of sufficient funds to compensate artists, songwriters, and
copyright holders; the requirement that low-volume users subsidize copyright
holders and high-volume users," and free riding.15
1. Partiiatiion. Even before reaching any of these problems, the music
industry and a sufficient number of individual users must first agree to participate
in the scheme. Securing participation is essential because by its very nature file
sharing requires reliable cooperation. However, because the voluntary collective
licensing scheme ensures royalty payments and low-cost promotion to rights
148 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
149 ASCAP and BMI have done so well that perhaps those organizations should consider
expanding and integrating a digital performance rights component into the existing performance
rights model. Although no practical reason excludes SESAC, the EFF authors are likely correct in
asserting that non-profit models run by the copyright holders are preferable to SESAC's for-profit
model to serve the interest of fairly compensating writers and publishers for use of their work. See
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 4. In fact, both performance rights
organizations, along with SESAC, support the proposal. See Yu, supra note 108, at 714.
s0 Yu, supra note 108, at 715.
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holders and the freedom to share files without fear of infringement to individual
users, the proposal is likely to attract both rights holders and file sharers.
Although "[t]he music industry is still a long way from admitting that its
existing business models are obsolete," the EFF authors predict that slumping
sales and failing lawsuits will soon convince the industry to consider the proposed
approach.' Artists and copyright holders are likely to join and "covenant not to
sue those who pay the blanket license fee," given the lack of alternatives and the
danger of remaining in their current rut.15
2
2. Dealing Directly with Millions of Users. The prospect of dealing with sixty
million individual users in the United States alone is daunting. 5 ' ASCAP and
BMI combined currently have only about five hundred thousand members, plus
radio stations.'54 The logistical problems in managing more than one hundred
times the number of members are obvious. However, file sharing services like
Napster may be able to diffuse the effect of such a massive influx of members by
acting as intermediaries. ASCAP and BMI or similarly structured collecting
organizations could issue blanket licenses to the file sharing services that in turn
would handle individual memberships. This solution would also have the benefit
of preserving competition between file sharing services, allowing consumers to
choose whichever service works best for them.
3. Jaywalkers. One of the most troubling obstacles to the success of the
voluntary collective licensing scheme in file sharing is the jaywalking problem:
even moral, otherwise law-abiding citizens cross streets in the middle of the
block.' 5 Unfortunately, many people view file sharing with the same lack of
concern as jaywalking. File sharers fail to recognize the damage they inflict on the
writers and publishers-breaking the law seems insignificant in comparison to the
personal benefits. 1 6 This attitude is so prevalent that in an informal survey the
... ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 4.
152 Id at 5.
l53 See von Lohman, supra note 7, at 641 (estimating that in 2004 there were sixty million
individual users in the United States); see also ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18,
at 2 (using sixty million users to calculate the total funds available to support a voluntary collective
licensing scheme).
154 See About ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (stating that
ASCAP has a membership of "over 230,000 composers, songwriters, lyricists and music publishers");
About BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about/ (last visited on Jan. 14, 2006) (stating that BMI
"represents more than 300,000 songwriters, composers and music publishers").
155 Interview with Bertis Edwin Downs IV, Adjunct Professor of Law, Univ. of Ga., Gen.
Counsel for R.E.M., in Athens, Ga. (Sept. 22, 2005).
156 See Litman, supra note 13, at 23-25 (stating that most people do not recognize the seriousness
of copyright infringement because there is no logical reason to think that sharing music constitutes
copyright infringement when sharing information is a perfectly acceptable and even encouraged use
of the Internet).
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author conducted, not one person interviewed said he or she would join a
voluntary collective licensing scheme, even for only five dollars a month.
The EFF authors are too quick to assume that looming lawsuits will inspire
file sharers to pay a membership fee to avoid liability even if those payments are
minimal and conveniently packaged with internet service fees or made directly
through websites for easy access." 7 They claim that "[tihe vast majority of file
sharers are willing to pay a reasonable fee for the freedom to download whatever
they like, using whatever software suits them.' 5  In truth, if sixty million file
sharers are active in the United States, and about fifteen thousand individuals have
been sued,'59 the odds of being pursued by the music industry are about one in
four thousand. This probability may be low enough that most people will ignore
the threat of a copyright infringement suit. Without further incentives, relying on
the fear of lawsuits to encourage membership in a file sharing licensing scheme
may have the unintended effect of causing the proliferation of lawsuits in order
to intimidate infringers more effectively.
4. Which Songs Count? Unpublished or otherwise commercially unavailable
songs draw many individuals to file sharing. 6 ' But those same "[olut-of-print
songs, many of which are currently available in P2P networks, present especially
difficult copyright clearance problems for record companies. It may be unclear
who, if anyone, has the right to reissue the song."' 6' Perhaps concern about
songs with unidentifiable copyright holders is unwarranted, but unauthorized
remixes and mash-ups, 62 in which identifiable songs are combined with other
identifiable songs, pose a particular threat to the voluntary collective licensing
scheme.
Because such arrangements often are created using compositions that are
subject to copyrights, deciding how or whether to include them in the scheme is
problematic. On one hand, if the song is included giving credit to the writer or
writers of the component compositions, the music industry ignores the creative
input of the remixer. On the other hand, if the voluntary collective licensing
157 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, stupra note 18, at 2.
'58 Id. at 5.
159 Press Release, Cindy Cohn & Fred von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People: Two Years Later
(Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org (follow "Press Room" hyperlink; then follow
"Breaking News Archive" hyperlink; then follow "November 2005, File-sharing Lawsuits Fail to
Deter P2P Downloaders" hyperlink) (stating that as of November 2005, the music industry has sued
about 15,000 individual users for file sharing, although they expect more to come).
16 Yu, supra note 108, at 701.
161 Id
16 A "mash-up" is a remix that combines two or more incongruous songs in a creative or
expressive way. Seegeneralt Roberta Cruger, The Mash-up Revolution, SALON, Aug. 9, 2003, http://
dir.salon.com/story/ent/music/feature/2003/08/09/mashups-croger/index-np.html (discussing
the mash-up phenomenon).
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scheme does not include the song, the industry risks perpetuating underground
file sharing services on which such remixes can be traded.
5. Who Gets the Money and How Is It Divided? Although both Professor Yu 163
and Professor Netane 64 worry over insufficient funds, paying rights holders
something for shared songs will be a clear improvement over the current
situation. As the services grow in popularity and membership, more money will
go into the pot. The real issue with the division of royalties collected from file-
sharing is deciding who gets paid.
The EFF authors fail to carefully discuss this issue indicating only that the
"money collected would then be divided between artists and rights-holders based on
the relative popularity of their music.""16 But under the ASCAP and BMI models,
only the writers and publishers get royalties, not the artists who perform the
music.
In the file sharing debate, however, performers have been very vocal about
stopping infringement.'" For example,
[a]s the rapper Eminem said candidly in his usual provocative style:
"Whoever put my s-t on the Internet, I want to meet that motherf-
ker and beat the s-t out of him... I'm sorry; when I worked 9 to 5,
I expected to get a f-king paycheck every week. It's the same with
music ... "
Artists who perform cover songs or buy songs from songwriters are
completely excluded under the current model. It is ultimately unsatisfying to
design a system that may fail to protect performers.'67
6. Cross-subsidization. Professors Yu and Netanel also both discuss the danger
of cross-subsidization. 68  Cross-subsidization, or "the requirement that low-
volume users subsidize copyright holders and high-volume users," is an
undeniable reality of any blanket licensing scheme. 69 When everyone pays five
dollars per month, users who download one song inevitably end up because they
will pay more per song than users who download one hundred songs. This
however, is only of marginal concern.
163 Id. at 709.
164 Yu, supra note 108, at 709.
16s ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis added).
166 Id. Although Eminem happens to write most of his own songs and would be covered under
the current model, his quote is indicative of the frustration artists have expressed with having their
music shared.
161 See discussion supra note 125.
"6 Yu, supra note 108, at 715; Netanel, supra note 1, at 67-68.
169 Yu, supra note 108, at 715.
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Of course, a system that requires everyone to pay for only what she uses
would be more fair, but part of the attraction of this model is that no user has to
make a commitment to a certain number of songs, and all users get the
convenience of a flat fee rather than having to pay per song. Also, we must
remember that the system is entirely voluntary. If a user finds that he only shares
one song per month, and that one song with the possibility of sharing more is not
worth his five dollars, he is always free to opt out. The danger, of course, is that
too many low-volume users decide to opt out thereby reducing the pool of
available files and consequently the value of the service to the remaining users and
decreasing the membership funds distributed as royalties.
7 °
7. Free Riders. And finally, the industry should legitimately be concerned
about free riders. A voluntary collective licensing scheme will not only allow free
riding, but will make free riding relatively easy to do and virtually impossible to
trace. A group of five friends could easily purchase one membership but share
all of the songs of interest to each of the five. Because each membership includes
the right to share unlimited songs, the industry would have no good way to
distinguish groups of users taking advantage of the system from one prolific file
sharer.
The EFF authors believe that free riding will be kept to a minimum: "So long
as the fee is reasonable, effectively invisible to fans, and does not restrict their
freedom, the vast majority of file sharers will opt to pay rather than engage in
complex evasion efforts."'' As noted above, however, free riding would not be
complex but actually relatively easy under this model. Professor Yu predicts that
the voluntary nature of the scheme will ultimately lead to its demise:
Being voluntary, such a system will also encourage free riding.
Many end-users may choose to stay outside of the system,
"borrowing" songs from their friends and from strangers they meet
on the Internet. Eventually, the system will break down. Thus, it
remains questionable whether voluntary collective licenses will
provide effective compensation to artists and songwriters injured by
widespread unauthorized copying on the Internet.'72
If too many users become free riders, reduced royalty collections will discourage
rights holders from joining. If fewer rights holders join, fewer individual users
will join and the system will eventually collapse. As with the concern for
170 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
171 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at 5.
172 Yu, supra note 108, at 715.
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insufficient funds, however, getting any payment will improve the current
situation, even if rights-holders are not compensated fairly.
V. CONCLUSION
Voluntary collective licensing is unquestionably an attractive solution to the
file sharing dilemma the music industry must now confront. Voluntary collective
licensing strives to treat all parties fairly, and its success in broadcast radio proves
that it can work. Therefore, the only question that remains is whether the unique
problems facing such a scheme as applied to file sharing are surmountable.
Ultimately, voluntary collectively licensing can succeed in the world of file
sharing, but it will require so much cooperation that its prospects are uncertain.
The writers and publishers must have incentives to join; the collecting
organization must resolve daunting logistical problems; and most importantly, file
sharers must understand the gravity of copyright infringement if they are to agree
to pay for something they now get for free.
Perhaps the expectation of free music can be discouraged through education.
After all, the generation currently fueling the file sharing boom is still relatively
young.
Children and teenagers cannot be expected to understand the
economic plight of artists and songwriters. Before the advent of
the Internet, their indifference did not matter to the recording
industry, because their only connection to music products was retail
purchases and consumption .... As they grow older and start
working full-time, their perspective on copyright may change. They
may come to empathize with artists and songwriters as they
experience the pain of not getting paid for a hard day's work.173
But waiting another decade for the members of Generation Y to figure out the
value of an honest day's work seems like an unreasonable delay for the rights
holders on whose copyrights file sharers are infringing right now.
In the final analysis, a voluntary collective licensing scheme has a reasonable
hope for success in file sharing given the history and experience of broadcast
radio. Because rights holders would sign non-exclusive agreements and individual
users would pay only five dollars, neither party would risk much, particularly
considering the potential benefits. But at the most basic level, the success of such
a scheme hinges on the number of individual users who agree to participate. No
113 Id. at 756.
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amount of statistical projection can guarantee success, but the music industry's
current business model guarantees failure.
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